This page was last updated February 23, 2010     
 
  Home
The Press


Subject Categories

Archaeology
Art History
Biography
Cultural & Social Studies
Economics, Banking,
Investment & Management

Education
Geography, Environment & Migration
History
Jewish Studies
Latin American Studies
Library Studies
Literary Criticism & Linguistics
Middle East Studies
Musicology
Philosophy
Politics, Media & IR
Psychology & Psychotherapy
Theatre & Drama
Theology & Religion
Women’s Studies
  Alpha Press
Libraries of Study
 

Asian Studies
Contemporary Spanish Studies
Critical Inventions
Demographic Developments
First Nations & Colonial Encounter
Latin American Studies
Peace Politics in the Middle East
Religious Beliefs & Practices
Spanish History
Spirituality in Education

   
 
  You are in: Home > Middle East Studies > In the Name of Oil  
 

In the Name of Oil
Anglo-American Relations in the Middle East, 1950–1958

Ivan L. G. Pearson

Ivan L. G. Pearson is a postdoctoral researcher at the European Commission’s Energy Security Unit in the Netherlands. He received his master’s and doctorate in International Relations from the University of Oxford, and holds a Bachelor’s degree from the University of Edinburgh.

 

“A valuable contribution to the existing literature on Anglo-American relations in general and on the International Relations of the Middle East in the 1950s in particular. The ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States has been a persistent theme in public discourse since the Second World War but it is rarely treated with analytical rigour. It is refreshing therefore to come across a critical and unsentimental account of how this relationship works out in practice.”Avi Shlaim, St. Antony’s, Oxford

Traditional historiographies of the Cold War in the Middle East contend that the Suez Crisis marked the demise of Britain’s political influence in the region. By contrast, using recently declassified documents, Ivan Pearson argues that although the Suez Crisis was cataclysmic on many dimensions, it did not mark a precipitous turning point in Britain’s ability to affect events in the Middle East decisively. Although Suez wholly undermined British prestige, and revealed severe shortcomings in its military capabilities, these losses were considerably offset by the increasing ability of British policymakers to influence the United States – a country with an emerging presence in the region. In several critical instances during the 1950s – both before and after the Crisis – British policymakers were successful in shaping events in the Middle East through a concerted lobbying effort that swayed the course of policy action pursued by the US.
In the Name of Oil documents the frequent bureaucratic infighting between the Administration, State Department, and CIA on the American side, as well as the way in which the British took advantage of the blurred line between communism and Arab nationalism in the Middle East to mislead the US into pursuing policies that would protect the cheap oil supplied by British-owned oil giants such as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Iraq Petroleum Company. The narrative explains the crucial role of local actors, and the tangled web of interests and circumstances: Western-backed coups, counter-coups, political intimidation, rigged elections, misinformation, and bribery. Barely a decade after the end of World War II, the war’s liberal democratic victors were engaged in dubious acts in the name of protecting Europe’s access to cheap Middle Eastern Oil.


 


Foreword by Avi Shlaim
Preface and Acknowledgements
List of Abbreviations


Introduction
Patrons and Clients in the Middle East
The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’
A Special Time and Place
Plan of the Book
Sources, Transliteration, and Terminology

1 Mohammad Mosaddeq, Oil, and Nationalism in Iran
Postwar Tension and Cold War Necessity
Truman’s Predicament
The Problem of Communism
“We must cajole and counsel her with infinite patience
and forbearance”
The Fresh Situation
Tipping Point
A Very British Plan
Appraising the British Contribution
Conclusion

2 The Most Useful of the Western Powers
The Persian Gulf
Occupation and Stalemate
An Independent Posture
“The last, and greatest, of our overseas assets”
Conclusion

3 Suez
British Neglect
American Antagonism
Grave American Concerns
Unscripted Excesses
In the Wake of the Intervention
New Blood
The Corridors of Power
Conclusion

4 A Chestnut from the Fire
Jordan in the Anglo-American Rubric
An Expensive Luxury
Ali Abu Nuwar
The Suez Cataclysm
“This is not a question of pulling a British chestnut out
of the fire”
The Prime Ministry and the Palace
Zerqa
The Domestic Opposition
Conclusion

5 The Syrian Crisis of 1957
Ripe to be Plucked
Imperial Defence after the Suez Base
Prelude to the Summer Crisis
“Illegalities and crimes behind the scenes”
A Suez in Reverse?
The British Become Involved
Regional Response
Conclusion

6 Wrong Together

Saving Chamoun
The Assassination of Matni
The Resurrection of Military Planning
Change of Heart
Better “to do wrong together than to do the right things alone”
Overcoming American Apprehension
The Balance Sheet
Conclusion

Conclusion

Notes
Bibliography
Index

 

Publication Details

 
ISBN:
978-1-84519-388-1 h/b
 
 
Page Extent / Format:
240 pp. / 229 x 152 mm
 
Release Date:
April 2010
  Illustrated:   No
 
Hardback Price:
£55.00 / $74.95
 
 

a
 
Order Item
 

This book can be ordered online or by telephone.

 
 

For the UK and Rest of the World:
Gazelle Book Services

tel. 44 (0)1524-68765

 
a

For the United States:
International Specialized Book Services

tel.  (1) 503 287-3093 or (800) 944-6190

a

For Canada:
University of Toronto Distribution

tel.  (1) 800-565-9523

a
a

 

 

© 2009 Sussex Academic Press   |   Disclaimer