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Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962–1965 Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins: Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action
Clive Jones
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“In addition to telling the story in great and often fascinating detail, the reader learns much that is unknown about the inner workings of the Royalist forces, as well as the shuttle diplomacy of key members of the Aden group negotiating with the anti-Nasserite forces, including Saudi-Arabia, Jordan, and Iran… For Jones, the Yemen civil war was a forerunner to present-day civil wars, in terms of the difficulties encountered by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and the emergence of mercenary or private military organizations. While covering much well-trodden ground on the coup and early debates on whether Britain should recognize the new regime in Yemen, Jones’s important and significant contribution is his analysis of the British Mercenary Organization (BMO) inside Yemen.” The International History Review
“Clive Jones describes how British covert – official and unofficial – involvement providing cash and materiel for Royalist forces had the objective of keeping the Republican government and its Egyptian backers so preoccupied with a civil war of attrition that Nasser in particular would be frustrated in his attempts to rid South Arabia, of both the British military presence and HMG’s protégé, the Federation of South Arabia… Jones’s descriptions of mercenary activities, the machinations of the Saudis and Jordanians, is all derring do and a rattling good yarn. A rare combination of a sober academic study and a riveting page-turner!”Asian Affairs
“A fascinating work. As Jones shows, the extent to which policy-makers were willing to support private clandestine activity to secure what were perceived to be British interests in the region is the ‘untold story’ of this conflict.” Middle Eastern Studies
“An
impressive book that makes a real contribution to the historiography
of Britain’s role in the Middle East.”
Small Wars and Insurgencies
Between 1962 and 1965 Britain
engaged in covert operations in support of Royalist forces fighting
the Egyptian backed Republican regime that had seized power in the
Yemeni capital Sana’a in September 1962. Covert action was regarded as a legitimate tool of foreign policy as Britain attempted to secure the future of the newly formed South Arabian Federation against the animus of Nasser. The use of covert action, as well as the quasi approval given to the use of mercenaries to support the Royalist cause, was the inevitable result of policy differences within Whitehall (most notably between the ‘mandarins’ of
the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office) as well as international
constraints imposed upon the UK in the aftermath of the Suez crisis.
The book examines the extent to which British policy, while successful
in imposing a war of attrition upon Nasser in the Yemen, contributed
to the political demise of the very objective covert action was designed
to secure: the future stability of the Federation of South Arabia.
